Nominal Index
Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company Private Limited & Ors., 2026 LLBiz SC 239
A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others, 2026 LLBiz SC 237
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited v. M/s Rukma Decor and Construction Company, 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 714
Turner Morrison Ltd. v. Rani Parvati Devi & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 713
Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Toyo Engineering Corporation & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 709
Supreme Advertising Private Limited v. Genus Power Infrastructures Limited, 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 707
National Highways Authority of India v. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Union Bank of India Ltd. & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 701
WAPCOS Limited v. Virgo Aqua, 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 696
M/s Tynor Orthotics Pvt. Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council & Ors., 2026 LLBiz HC (HP) 26
Hitachi Energy India Limited v. M/s Sarda Energy and Minerals Limited & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (CHH) 19
M/s Gulab Chand Jain v. Municipal Corporation Raipur & Ors., 2026 LLBiz HC (CHH) 18
Sri Buddha–SVEC JV v. Western Coalfields Ltd., 2026 LLBiz HC (BOM) 397
Vinod Kumar Saraf v. Villayati Ram Mittal & Ors., 2026 LLBiz HC (BOM) 398
Unistar Metals Private Limited v. GE Power Limited, 2026 LLBiz HC (BOM) 400
Karthik Exports & Anr. v. Krishna Kumar Agarwal & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (KER) 128
Sreekala K.V. v. Project Director, National Highways Authority of India & Ors., 2026 LLBiz HC (KER) 129
Omkar Tradecomm LLP & Ors. v. Mayank Agarwal & Ors., 2026 LLBiz HC (CAL) 172
Lipika Ghosh v. Great Island Development Company and Others, 2026 LLBiz HC (CAL) 174
ITD-ITD CEM Joint Venture v. Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LLBiz HC (CAL) 175
Vatchala Kanagasabapathy & Anr. v. M/s Eros Theater Shantha Sundaram Mahal & Ors., 2026 LLBiz HC (MAD) 186
Nirmal Datacomm Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. M/s Redington (India) Ltd. & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (MAD) 179
Indore Sahkari Dugdh Sangh & Anr. v. Ashutosh Sharma, Director & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (GUJ) 90
MSP Infrastructures Limited v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LLBiz HC (MP) 52
M/s Eagle Infra India Limited v. Jharkhand Urban Infrastructure Development Company Limited & Anr., 2026 LLBiz HC (JHAR) 16
Supreme Court
Case Title : Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company Private Limited & Ors.
Case Number : Civil Appeal Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 7233–7234 of 2026
Citation : 2026 LLBiz SC 239
The Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled that High Courts should exercise "extreme circumspection" before using their supervisory powers to interfere with ongoing arbitral proceedings.
It held that orders rejecting jurisdictional objections during arbitration are ordinarily challengeable only after the final arbitral award.
A bench of Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Vijay Bishnoi observed that the constitutional power of High Courts cannot be taken away. At the same time, it observed that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is intended to ensure the expeditious resolution of disputes through arbitration with minimal judicial interference.
"Orders passed by the Tribunal on an application under Section 16 of the Act are ordinarily amenable to challenge only under Section 34 of the Act upon the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings and the passing of the final award. It is always safe for the High Courts that, before entertaining revision petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the Orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, while exercising powers under Section 16 of the Act, it should record a prima facie finding regarding the patent lack of inherent jurisdiction and that too after providing an opportunity of hearing to the rival party/parties.", the court held.
Case Title : A.K. Ghosh & Company and others versus Biman Bose and others
Case Number : SLP (C) Nos. 15817 & 15818 of 2025
Citation : 2026 LLBiz SC 237
The Supreme Court on Monday held that a plaintiff in a commercial suit cannot file a written statement to a defendant's counterclaim beyond the mandatory outer limit of 120 days prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act.
It ruled that the statutory timeline applicable to defendants equally governs plaintiffs replying to counterclaims.
A bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran ruled that the mandatory timeline under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to a plaintiff's written statement to a counterclaim in a commercial suit.
"Viewed thus, we answer the question posed in the affirmative. A plaintiff in a commercial suit, governed by the CC Act, is bound by the mandate of the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, as applicable to a commercial suit, and must file a written statement to a counter-claim by a defendant therein, ordinarily within 30 days from the date of service of summons or receipt of the counter-claim, and in the event a plaintiff fails to file such a written statement within that time but offers sufficient cause for the delay, the Court may extend the time to do so, for reasons to be recorded in writing and upon payment of appropriate costs, but not beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons upon the plaintiff/receipt of the counter-claim by the plaintiff.", the top court ruled.
High Courts
Delhi High Court
Delhi High Court Rules Section 43(3) Of Arbitration Act Cannot Save Void Arbitration Clause
Case Title : Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited v. M/s Rukma Decor and Construction Company
Case Number : FAO (COMM) 143/2024
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 714
The Delhi High Court has recently held that a provision empowering courts to extend the contractual time for commencing arbitration in cases of undue hardship cannot, by itself, validate a contractual clause that is otherwise void under the law.
Referring to Section 43(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the court observed,
"The provision does not validate or positively enact the enforceability of contractual time-bar clauses. It addresses only the limited question of whether a court may grant an extension of time in cases of undue hardship where the contractual time limit has expired. The precondition for the exercise of this power is that there exists a valid time-bar clause; Section 43(3) does not, by its own force, render otherwise void clauses valid. Whether a particular clause is void under Section 28 of the Contract Act-a question antecedent to and independent of Section 43(3) - falls to be determined by the Contract Act itself."
Case Title: Turner Morrison Ltd. v. Rani Parvati Devi & Anr.
Case Number : FAO(OS)(COMM) 130/2020
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 713
The Delhi High Court on 16 July held that Courts cannot interfere under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act with an arbitral tribunal's plausible interpretation of a contract merely because another view is possible, while dismissing Turner Morrison Ltd.'s appeal against parts of an award.
A Division Bench of Justices Anil Kshetrapal and Amit Mahajan upheld the tribunal's interpretation of the Construction Agreement with the Namgyal Institute for Research on Ladakhi Art and Culture (NIRLAC), including its findings on the recovery of construction costs, the commencement of interest liability and the rejection of Turner Morrison's claims for service and electricity charges, contractual penalty and compound interest. The judges held:
“Upon careful examination of the common award as well as the impugned judgment, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly opined that the view taken by the learned Arbitrator is plausible and the same is based on a scrupulous examination of the relevant law as well as the contractual clauses, which cannot be interfered with in the present proceedings.”
Delhi High Court Upholds ₹662 Crore Toyo-L&T Award, Says Contract Interpretation Cannot Be Revisited
Case Title: Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Toyo Engineering Corporation & Anr.
Case Number: O.M.P. (COMM) 316/2019
Citation: 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 709
The Delhi High Court on 15 July upheld an arbitral award of around Rs. 662 crore in favour of the consortium of Toyo Engineering Corporation and Larsen & Toubro Limited, holding that an arbitral tribunal's plausible interpretation of contractual terms cannot be re-examined under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Justice Amit Bansal dismissed the petition filed by Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) challenging the award, holding that the arbitral tribunal had adopted a possible interpretation of the contract provisions relating to extension of time and price adjustment. He observed:
“The petitioner, by way of the present petition, in effect, seeks a reappreciation of evidence and an alternative interpretation of clauses the Contract, which is beyond the scope of interference under Section 34 of the Act.”
Delhi High Court Upholds Arbitral Award, Says Tribunal Cannot Revisit Merits After Passing Award
Case Title : Supreme Advertising Private Limited v. Genus Power Infrastructures Limited (and connected matter)
Case Number : O.M.P. (COMM) 115/2016 & O.M.P. (COMM) 159/2016
Citation: 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 707
The Delhi High Court has held that once an arbitral award is passed, the arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio and cannot reopen the merits of its decision. Its powers thereafter are confined to correcting computational, clerical, typographical, or similar errors.
Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar delivered the ruling while dismissing cross-petitions filed by Supreme Advertising Private Limited and Genus Power Infrastructures Limited.
The court observed, "Once an award is rendered, the learned Tribunal becomes functus officio except to the limited extent preserved under the A&C Act. Section 33 of the A&C Act constitutes one such statutory exception and permits correction of computational, clerical, typographical and similar errors occurring in the award."
Case Title : National Highways Authority of India v. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Union Bank of India Ltd. & Anr.
Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 137/2025 and FAO(OS) (COMM) 152/2025
Citation: 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 701
The Delhi High Court on 9 July held that a party cannot avoid contractual obligations arising from a Provisional Completion Certificate (PCC) after its issuance by subsequently keeping the certificate in abeyance.
A Division Bench comprising Justices V. Kameswar Rao and Vinod Kumar dismissed two appeals filed by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) against lender banks led by South Indian Bank Limited. It observed:
“The aforesaid conclusion of the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge is justified and cannot be said to be perverse in law. It is a plausible interpretation, which cannot be interfered with.”
Case Title: WAPCOS Limited v. Virgo Aqua
Case Number :FAO(OS) (COMM) 97/2024
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 696
The Delhi High Court has held that a court hearing a challenge to an arbitral award under the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 ("MSME Act") is not barred from examining a credible, ex facie plea that the award is a nullity merely because the buyer has not deposited 75% of the awarded amount under Section 19 of the Act.
Explaining why the pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 could not prevent scrutiny of such an award, the court observed:
"The requirement of pre-deposit under Section 19 of the MSMED Act necessarily presupposes the existence of a valid award, which is capable of legal recognition as an award under law. Section 19 of the MSMED Act is intended to regulate challenges to valid awards rendered under the statutory framework of the MSMED Act. The provision cannot be construed as compelling a party to first comply with the pre-deposit requirement before it is permitted to contend that the very instrument sought to be enforced is non-est and devoid of legal existence. Where a credible and ex-facie case of nullity is made out on the perusal of the face of the record of the Facilitation Council, the Court under Section 34 or Section 37 of the Act of 1996 is not denuded of its jurisdiction to examine the issue of nullity of the award merely because the requirement of pre-deposit has not been fulfilled."
Himachal Pradesh High Court
Individual Arbitrator Cannot Be Appointed For MSME Disputes U/S 18 MSMED Act: Himachal Pradesh HC
Case Title : M/s Tynor Orthotics Pvt. Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council & Ors. (connected with M/s Tynor Orthotics Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Kunal Aluminium Company & Anr.)
Case Number : CWP No. 8278 of 2022 along with Arbitration Case No. 206 of 2022
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(HP) 26
The Himachal Pradesh High Court on 7 July held that a Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council cannot refer disputes under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) to an individual arbitrator and must either decide the dispute itself or refer it to an arbitral institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services.
A Bench of Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua set aside the ex parte arbitral award passed against Tynor Orthotics Pvt. Ltd. and quashed the reference made by the Himachal Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, holding that the Council had exceeded its statutory powers by appointing an individual arbitrator. It observed:
“Firstly, it is to be noticed that the empanelment of an arbitrator by the State Government would not make such arbitrators fall within the definition of the word 'Institution' or 'centre' of arbitration' as assigned in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Even if empanelled by the State Government, the arbitrator so empanelled would remain an individual arbitrator.”
Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title : Hitachi Energy India Limited v. M/s Sarda Energy and Minerals Limited & Anr. connected with Hitachi Energy India Limited v. ABB Limited & Anr.
Case Number : REVP No. 392 of 2025 and REVP No. 362 of 2025
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (CHH) 19
The Chhattisgarh High Court has restored multinational engineering company ABB Ltd. as a party to two pending arbitration appeals after Hitachi Energy India Ltd. challenged an earlier order substituting it in ABB's place.
The court held that ABB could not be discharged from the proceedings merely on its own assertion that liability in the pending appeals had transferred to Hitachi under a National Company Law Tribunal-approved Scheme of Arrangement.
Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi held that whether liabilities arising from the pending appeals had transferred to Hitachi remained a disputed question. The issue, the court observed, required adjudication after impleading and hearing the alleged successor entity.
"If ABB Ltd. seeks to contend that, by virtue of the Scheme of Arrangement approved by the NCLT, such liability has stood transferred to Hitachi Energy India Ltd. (formerly ABB Power Products and Systems India Ltd.), the said contention necessarily requires adjudication after impleading and hearing the alleged successor entity. Until such determination is made, ABB Ltd. cannot be discharged from the proceedings merely on its own assertion of transfer of liability." the court observed.
Case Title : M/s Gulab Chand Jain v. Municipal Corporation Raipur & Ors.
Case Number : WP227 No. 651 of 2026
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (CHH) 18
The Chhattisgarh High Court on 2 July held that a party cannot defeat adjudication of a commercial dispute on merits by raising a technical objection that it filed a Section 34 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before a court without pecuniary jurisdiction.
Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal dismissed a writ petition filed by Gulab Chand Jain challenging the transfer of the Municipal Corporation, Raipur's challenge to an arbitral award directing it to pay Rs. 2.32 crore with 8% annual interest to the contractor, and upheld the transfer of the proceedings from the Court of the 9th Additional District Judge, Raipur to the Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Nava Raipur. He observed:
"The transfer did not confer jurisdiction where none existed; rather, it facilitated continuation of proceedings before the Court which alone possessed jurisdiction under the statutory notification. No adjudication on merits was undertaken by the transferor Court after noticing the pecuniary limitation. The learned 9th Additional District Judge, Raipur merely acted in aid of implementation of the statutory notification and the directions issued by the High Court."
Bombay High Court
Case Title : Sri Buddha–SVEC JV v. Western Coalfields Ltd.
Case Number: Misc. Civil Application (Arbn) No. 34 of 2026
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(BOM) 397
The Bombay High Court has recently held that where a commercial contract contains conflicting dispute resolution clauses, courts should lean in favour of arbitration if the agreement, read as a whole, reflects the parties' intention to resolve disputes through arbitration.
Justice M. W. Chandwani of the Nagpur bench delivered the ruling while deciding an application filed by Sri Buddha–SVEC JV against Western Coalfields Ltd.
The court referred the parties to conciliation before Advocate Harish Thakur and directed that if the process failed, the dispute would stand referred to arbitration before Justice R.K. Deshpande (Retd.), subject to his consent and the disclosure required under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
Observing that conflicting drafting should not defeat an otherwise valid arbitration agreement, the court held, "It is worthwhile to mention that when there are conflicting and confusing clauses, the Court shall rule in favour of arbitration, not giving weightage to confusing clauses. The Court should ignore the clauses of the contract which may create confusion about existence of the agreement, since arbitration is aimed at removing bottlenecks or declogging the courts from a docket explosion. In such cases, the Court should rule to advance arbitration."
Case Title: Vinod Kumar Saraf v. Villayati Ram Mittal & Ors.
Case Number : Comm Arbitration Petition (L) No. 13434 of 2026
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(BOM) 398
The Bombay High Court has recently held that territorial jurisdiction cannot be determined solely by the location of partnership properties or the registered office of a partnership firm where the partnership deed containing an arbitration clause does not specify the arbitral seat.
Instead, the court held, the material facts constituting the foundation of the relief sought must determine jurisdiction.
Justice Amit Borkar delivered the ruling while deciding a petition filed by Vinod Kumar Saraf seeking interim protection against Villayati Ram Mittal and its partners in a partnership dispute.
The court observed, "The authorities discussed above establish that territorial jurisdiction cannot be determined either looking at the place where immovable properties are situated or merely by referring to the registered office of the partnership. Jurisdiction cannot be assumed solely because eviction proceedings are pending before a Court situated within a particular territory. What is required is identification of material facts which constitute the foundation of the relief sought under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act."
Case Title : Unistar Metals Private Limited v. GE Power Limited
Case Number : Arbitration Application (L) No. 15413 of 2026
Citation: 2026 LLBiz HC(BOM) 400
The Bombay High Court on 14 July held that a defective notice invoking arbitration does not invalidate the commencement of arbitral proceedings where the arbitration agreement has been invoked and the disputes between the parties are clearly identified.
Justice Arun R. Pedneker appointed former Bombay High Court Judge Justice Anuja Prabhudessai as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between Unistar Metals Private Limited and GE Power Limited under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. He observed:
“There is no objection to the notice under Section 21 to the name of sole arbitrator on the ground that the agreement specifies arbitral tribunal should be of three arbitrators. Names of three arbitrators are not suggested by the Respondent. The dispute persists, and the notice under Section 21 has not resulted in the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. On the failure of constitution of the arbitral tribunal, this Court gets jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6). The purpose of notice under Section 21 is time-related and if the arbitral tribunal is not constituted as per the agreed procedure, this Court gets jurisdiction to appoint an 'Arbitral Tribunal' under Section 11(6).”
Kerala High Court
Case Title : Karthik Exports & Anr. v. Krishna Kumar Agarwal & Anr.
Case Number : CRP No. 437 of 2025
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(KER) 128
The Kerala High Court has held that an arbitral tribunal can decide a claim raised by one respondent against another under a tripartite agreement where the parties have agreed to refer all disputes arising out of the contract to arbitration.
The court ruled that although the claim had been labelled a "counterclaim", it was, in substance, an independent contractual claim between parties to the same agreement. It also noted that Section 19 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 makes it clear that arbitral tribunals are not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
As a result, the restriction under Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC on counterclaims solely against a co-defendant could not apply in the present case.
Justice T.R. Ravi delivered the ruling while dismissing a petition filed by Karthik Exports and its managing partner, S. Vijayan. They had challenged a Commercial Court order declaring executable an arbitral award directing commission agent Krishna Kumar Agarwal to pay about ₹1.34 crore, along with 8% annual interest, to Preetha Vijayan, wife of S. Vijayan.
The court observed, “There can hence be no doubt that the parties had agreed to refer all disputes and differences arising out of the contract for arbitration. Claim of the 1st respondent against the 1st petitioner is one arising from the contract and hence is arbitrable. After having agreed before the High Court of Calcutta for reference to arbitration in an application in which all the parties to the contract were parties either as petitioner or respondents, it is not open to the petitioners to submit that the claim of the 1st respondent as against the 1st petitioner cannot be subject matter of the arbitration. Though it has been referred to as a counter claim, it is in effect a claim between the said parties.”
Case Title : Sreekala K.V. v. Project Director, National Highways Authority of India & Ors.
Case Number : Arbitration Appeal No. 26 of 2021
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(KER) 129
The Kerala High Court has held that overlooking the provisions of the enabling statute while passing an arbitral award is an act in contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law.
It said such a glaring contravention justifies interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, while upholding the setting aside of an arbitral award that had enhanced compensation for land acquired for the NH-47 bypass.
Justice S. Manu observed, "Above all, the arbitrator has not properly applied his mind in the matter of fixing of market value with reference to the various factors enumerated under Section 3G(7) of the National Highways Act. Failure in this regard is a patent illegality. Exercising the authority to pass an award, overlooking the provisions of the enabling statute, is definitely an act in contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The said glaring contravention justifies interference in a proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act."
Calcutta High Court
Case Title : Omkar Tradecomm LLP & Ors. Vs. Mayank Agarwal & Ors.
Case Number : A.P.O. No. 41 of 2024 With AP/850/2022
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (CAL) 172
The Calcutta High Court has held that the requirement to institute commercial disputes before its Commercial Division applies not only to suits but also to applications involving the specified value.
A Division Bench of Justices Debangsu Basak and Md. Shabbar Rashidi clarified that Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 governs not only commercial suits but also applications, including petitions under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
It accordingly set aside the Single Judge's June 15, 2023 judgment after holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to receive and decide the Section 9 petitions. The Bench also dismissed the underlying Section 9 proceedings.
The Court observed, "Filing of the suits in Commercial Division is governed by Section 7 of the Act of 2015. Section 7 also governs the filing of applications relating to commercial dispute of a Specified Value. Section 7 of the Act of 2015, therefore, should not be dissected to mean that, so far as filing of suits are concerned, suits involving commercial dispute of a Specified Value must be filed in the Commercial Division while, an application under the Act of 1996 relating to a commercial dispute of a Specified Value can be filed either in the non-Commercial Division or in the Commercial Division."
Withdrawal Of Civil Suit Doesn't Extinguish Arbitration Agreement: Calcutta High Court
Case Title : Lipika Ghosh v. Great Island Development Company and Others
Case Number : AP 79 of 2025
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (CAL) 174
The Calcutta High Court has held that withdrawal of an earlier civil suit without liberty to institute fresh proceedings does not extinguish the arbitration agreement or bar a subsequent petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for constitution of an arbitral tribunal.
In doing so, the Court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, which involved the unconditional withdrawal of an earlier Section 11 application.
Justice Gaurang Kanth held that the effect of withdrawing the civil suit may be raised as a defence against the maintainability of particular claims before the arbitral tribunal, but it cannot prevent the constitution of the tribunal itself.
The Court observed, “The present proceeding is not one for adjudication of claims but merely for constitution of the arbitral forum. The Court is therefore not required to determine whether a particular claim would ultimately be maintainable before the Tribunal. The withdrawal of the suit may furnish a defence before the Tribunal regarding the maintainability of any particular claim, but cannot extinguish the arbitration agreement itself. At this stage, this Court is merely called upon to constitute an Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication of the disputes between the parties. It would, therefore, be premature for this Court to examine whether the claim which the petitioner intends to pursue before the Tribunal would be barred by principles of res judicata, or otherwise.”
Calcutta High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Rejecting ₹205.70 Crore Claims Against KMRCL
Case Title : ITD-ITD CEM JOINT VENTURE Vs. KOLKATA METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD.
Case Number : APOT/103/2026
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (CAL) 175
The Calcutta High Court on Tuesday dismissed an appeal filed by ITD-ITD CEM Joint Venture and upheld an arbitral award rejecting its claims of about ₹205.70 crore against Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (KMRCL).
It found no ground to interfere with the tribunal's conclusions or the earlier order refusing to set aside the award.
A division bench of Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi upheld the May 8, 2026 judgment of the Single Judge.
It held, "We are of the view that the Learned Single Judge has correctly exercised parameters of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 in evaluating the challenge to the award. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order or the award."
Madras High Court
Case Title : Vatchala Kanagasabapathy and Anr v. M/s Eros Theater Shantha Sundaram Mahal and Ors
Case Number : Arb. Appln No. 1688 of 2025
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(MAD) 186
The Madras High Court has held that a sole arbitrator can proceed to pronounce an arbitral award even if the respondents' counsel does not produce documents he had undertaken to file and later withdraws his vakalat, provided the matter has already been reserved for passing of the award.
The court held that no further orders were required in the application and closed it.
Justice K. Kumaresh Babu observed, "This Court is of the view that, when the matter had been reserved for passing of the award and an undertaking had been given by the learned counsel for the respondents to produce certain documents, which had not been produced, there is no necessity to seek the consent of the respondent to pass the award and the learned Arbitrator can proceed to pass the award in accordance with law.”
Case Title : Nirmal Datacomm Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. M/s Redington (India) Ltd. & Anr.
Case Number : OSA No. 16 of 2020
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(MAD) 179
The Madras High Court has held that a party that knew of arbitral proceedings, sought adjournments, and then remained ex parte cannot raise a challenge to the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator for the first time in a Section 37 appeal after remaining silent for nearly ten years.
A Division Bench of Justice P. Velmurugan and Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi dismissed an appeal by Nirmal Datacomm Private Limited and others against an arbitral award directing them to pay Redington (India) Limited over ₹6.44 crore with 18% interest.
Holding that the appellants' conduct amounted to waiver and acquiescence, the Court observed:
“In the present case, the appellants/respondents who had notice of the Arbitral proceedings, sought time to appear before the Arbitrator, but thereafter, deliberately failed to participate, and remained silent for nearly 10 years ordinarily cannot later challenged the unilateral appointment of the Arbitrator for the first time in proceedings under Section 34 of the A&C Act, 1996. Further, under Section 4 of the A&C Act, 1996, the party who knows of a procedural irregularity but proceeds without timely objection is deemed to have waived the objection. Under Section 16 of the A&C Act, 1996, objections relating to the jurisdiction or constitution of the Tribunal should ordinarily be raised before the Arbitral Tribunal itself.”
Gujarat High Court
Case Title: Indore Sahkari Dugdh Sangh & Anr. v. Ashutosh Sharma, Director & Anr.
Case Number : R/First Appeal No. 4935 of 2023
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC(GUJ) 90
The Gujarat High Court has set aside an arbitral award after finding that the arbitrator unnecessarily hastened to close a party's right to lead evidence during the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Court held that such treatment violated the requirement under Section 18 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to treat the parties equally and give each side a full opportunity to present its case.
A Division Bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice D.N. Ray set aside an award dated July 16, 2021, under which a contractor had been granted approximately ₹1.98 crore against Indore Sahkari Dugdh Sangh.
The Court found it particularly significant that the arbitrator had acknowledged that several months remained available for making the award, but still refused to accept notarised affidavits tendered one day after the respondents' evidence had been closed.
The bench observed, “What is not palatable to us is that, despite noting the fact that ample time was available for the award to be made and that the respondents had notarized affidavits which they were seeking to place on record in the proceedings, which were being conducted right in the midst of the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, the learned Arbitrator closed the right of the respondents and proceeded to deliver the award.”
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Case Title : MSP Infrastructures Limited v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd.
Case Number : Arbitration Case No. 53 of 2024
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (MP) 52
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently held that a party cannot reopen the issue of maintainability at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator after having challenged an earlier arbitral award and after a court permitted fresh arbitration if disputes persisted.
The ruling came while the court appointed a fresh arbitrator to adjudicate a dispute between MSP Infrastructures Limited and Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. (MPRDCL).
Justice Deepak Khot held that the question of maintainability had already been settled between the parties in earlier proceedings. The court appointed former Madhya Pradesh High Court judge Justice Ved Prakash Sharma as the sole arbitrator.
The court observed, "Once the non applicant has prosecuted section 34 application under the Act of 1996, wherein liberty has been granted to the applicant to further arbitrate if dispute persists between the parties, then, in such case, the non applicant cannot reopen the issue of maintainability at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator under the Act of 1996."
Jharkhand High Court
Jharkhand HC Directs JUIDCO To Pay Eagle Infra's Dues, Holds Guarantee Release Admits Completion
Case Title : M/s Eagle Infra India Limited v. Jharkhand Urban Infrastructure Development Company Limited & Anr.
Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 1563 of 2025
Citation : 2026 LLBiz HC (JHAR) 16
The Jharkhand High Court on 15 July held that a public authority cannot withhold admitted contractual dues after releasing a contractor's performance bank guarantee, as such release shows that the authority accepted the contractor's satisfactory completion of contractual obligations.
Justice Ananda Sen allowed Eagle Infra India Limited's writ petition and directed Jharkhand Urban Infrastructure Development Company Limited (JUIDCO) to clear the contractor's pending dues under the Harmu River Rejuvenation Project with 10% annual interest. The Bench observed:
“Release of Bank Guarantee / Performance Guarantee in favour of the petitioner will lead to the only inevitable conclusion that the petitioner has completed all its obligations under the contract even the post execution to the full satisfaction of the respondent. This act of release of Bank Guarantee is an admission of the respondent by conduct in support of the fact of unblemished completion of the work to the satisfaction of the Respondent.”