Personality Rights Extend To Everyone, Not Just Celebrities; Mere Use Of Identity Not Unlawful: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court has prima facie observed that personality rights are available to every individual and not just celebrities. It has clarified, however, that the mere use of a person's identity does not by itself amount to an infringement.

“The rights are available to every individual. Fame bears on whether an identity has commercial value and on the loss caused by its misuse; it is not a condition of the right. Equally, the mere use of a person's identity is not, by itself, unlawful,” Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav observed.

The court made these observations while hearing a suit filed by actor Kriti Sanon seeking protection against the alleged unauthorised use of her name, image, likeness, and voice.

Before setting out its understanding of personality rights, the court clarified that the contesting defendants had not yet been heard and that it was not finally deciding the legal questions at this stage. It described its discussion as a prima facie understanding based on the material then available on record.

The court explained that “personality rights” do not constitute a single cause of action but are an umbrella description for several distinct legal claims that may arise when a person's identity is used without consent.

"Personality rights” is not a single cause of action. It is a description of several distinct claims that may arise when a person‟s identity is used without consent. The right of publicity, passing off, the right of privacy, defamation, and, where their conditions are met, rights under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957, including performers‟ rights,” it observed.

It explained that these claims protect different interests. Privacy, dignity, and reputation are personal interests that cannot be assigned and end with the individual. The right of publicity, on the other hand, protects the commercial value of a person's identity and can be licensed.

“These claims protect two different interests. Privacy, dignity and reputation are personal interests; they cannot be assigned and they end with the person. The right of publicity protects the commercial value of identity; it can be licensed,” the court observed.

The court further distinguished the right of publicity from the right to privacy and the tort of passing off.

“The right of publicity is, therefore, not the same as the right of privacy, though it has roots in it. If it were merely a facet of a fundamental right, it could not be licensed at all, and the endorsement arrangements on which it rests would have no legal basis. Nor is it the same as passing off, which requires a misrepresentation as to endorsement or association,” it observed.

It cautioned that describing all these claims as “personality rights” cannot dilute the legal requirements applicable to each.

“Each claim carries its own elements, defences and remedy. Placing them all under one label cannot lower the threshold that applies to any one of them, whether the high threshold for pre-trial restraint of defamatory speech, or the free speech limits on the right of publicity,” the court held.

The court also referred to its earlier decision in Krishna Kishore Singh v. Sarla A. Saraogi, which rejected the notion of “celebrity rights” as an additional bundle of rights.

“Rights which emanate from one's personality, and persona, would be available to one and all, and not only to celebrities,” the earlier decision had observed. It had also cautioned that “The law cannot allow itself to be a vehicle to promote celebrity culture”.

The court noted that no statute creates the composite right pleaded as “personality rights”. It said a plaintiff seeking protection must identify, for each defendant and each item of content, the particular claim being made and the material supporting it.

“It follows that a plaintiff, as in the present case has, must indicate, defendant-wise and content-wise, which of these claims is made and on what material; and relief, particularly at the interim stage, must be correspondingly specific. All the claims in a suit of this kind cannot be put under one umbrella and met with one omnibus injunction,” it observed.

Sanon had complained of five categories of alleged misuse of her identity. These included offers for appearance bookings made in her name; social media accounts claiming to be her official presence or circulating AI-generated and morphed images; merchandise bearing her images; AI chatbots, synthetic voice models, and prompt-based image generation presented as her; and pornographic deepfakes.

The court's prima facie assessment was that some accounts misrepresented an association with Sanon or impersonated her. It also observed that certain AI-generated, morphed, and sexually suggestive content engaged her privacy and dignity.

The chatbots and voice models, as well as the image-generation service, prima facie appropriated the commercial value of her identity and affronted her dignity. It found that the pornographic deepfakes had no expressive value.

The court left open the question of whether merchandise in which the image itself is the product falls within the right of publicity. It included the seller in the interim arrangement because some of the products were alleged to use images from Sanon's personal life.

The court also considered the obligations of online intermediaries under the Information Technology Act and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. It noted that intermediaries are parties for compliance, rather than wrongdoers, and that directions to remove content must identify the material concerned.

It further noted that the 2026 amendments to the IT Rules brought synthetically generated information within the framework and shortened the timelines for action. Since Sanon had written to the intermediaries on August 27, 2026, and three of them had not responded, the court observed that she could not be faulted for approaching it. The order would constitute actual knowledge for the purposes of Rule 3(1)(d), it held.

As an interim measure, the court directed certain defendants to take down or disable access to identified URLs. It directed the authorities concerned to issue blocking directions in respect of specified websites. It also restrained specified defendants from uploading, hosting, generating, or making available further material of a similar nature, including content impersonating Sanon, sexually explicit or morphed images, videos or audio, AI-generated material, chatbots or voice models presented as her, and the merchandise placed on record.

The court clarified that the order would not restrain news, reviews, criticism, commentary, satire, parody, caricature, or fan expression that did not fall within the categories covered by its directions.

It made clear that all its observations were prima facie and only for the interim arrangement. The matter will next be heard on December 10, 2026.