Letters Patent Appeal Not Maintainable Against Single Judge's Order Under Trade Marks Act: Gujarat High Court

The Gujarat High Court has ecently held that a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA), an intra-court appeal before a Division Bench, is not maintainable against a Single Judge's decision in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Holding so, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice D.N. Ray said such appeals are barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The bench also held that Parliament's decision to omit the second-appeal provision that existed under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, reinforces this interpretation.

Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act allows a person aggrieved by an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks to approach the High court.

The key issue before the court, however, was whether a further intra-court appeal would lie against a Single Judge's decision under Section 91. While answering that question, the bench examined Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which bars certain second appeals.

"The language of Section 100A does not suggest that the exclusion of the right of appeal available under the Letters Patent is confined only to the matters arising under the Code and not under any enactments," the court observed.

The dispute arose from a common judgment dated July 11, 2025, passed by a Single Judge in statutory appeals under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act. Those appeals challenged an order dated February 27, 2023, passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad.

The Registrar had decided a trademark registration dispute. Raj Abhushan Bhandar challenged that decision before the Single Judge under Section 91.

Aggrieved by the Single Judge's judgment, M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar filed intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It sought a further round of appeal before a Division Bench.

The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks and the private respondent raised a preliminary objection. They argued that the appeals were not maintainable and should be rejected without examining the merits of the trademark dispute.

The bench framed three questions for consideration. It examined whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie against a Single Judge's order under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, whether such an order is passed in the High court's original or appellate jurisdiction for the purposes of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and whether Parliament's omission of the second-appeal provision contained in Section 109(5) of the 1958 Act reflected an intention to bar a further intra-court appeal.

To answer those questions, the bench examined Sections 127 to 132 of the Trade Marks Act and Rules 33, 45 and 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It held that the Registrar exercises powers akin to those of a civil court, including receiving evidence on affidavit, awarding costs executable as a civil court decree and reviewing its own decisions.

The bench relied on the Calcutta High Court's decision in Glorious Investment Ltd. v. Dunlop International Ltd.. It agreed that the Registrar functions as a tribunal with the trappings of a court, attracting the bar under Section 100A CPC.

The bench held that the bar under Section 100A CPC is not confined to matters arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. It extends to appeals arising under special statutes such as the Trade Marks Act.

The court also attached significance to the legislative history of the Trade Marks Act. It noted that, unlike Section 109(5) of the repealed Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, Section 91 of the 1999 Act does not provide for a second appeal before a Division Bench. According to the Bench, this reflected Parliament's intention to restrict trademark litigants to a single round of appeal before the High court.

"The legislative intent for exclusion of one more level of appeal under the special enactment is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration for avoiding inclusion of Letters Patent Appeal under the general appellate provisions of the Letters Patent," the court observed.

The bench held that a single judge deciding an appeal under Section 91 exercises appellate jurisdiction. Since the Registrar functions as a tribunal with the trappings of a court, the bar under Section 100A CPC, read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, applies.

The Letters Patent Appeals were dismissed as not maintainable. The bench clarified that it had not examined the merits of the underlying trademark dispute, leaving those issues open to be agitated in any other remedy available in law.