Delhi High Court Rejects Trademark Appeal Over “DIGESTO PLUS”, Says Mark Common To Trade

The Delhi High Court on 20 August dismissed an appeal filed by Hahnemann Scientific Laboratory India Pvt. Ltd. against Meera Rastogi, trading as Hahnemann Memorial Laboratory, in a trademark dispute over the use of the mark “DIGESTO PLUS”.

A Division Bench of Justices V. Kameswar Rao and Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora held that the word “DIGESTO” is common to the trade and cannot, by itself, establish deceptive similarity between competing marks. It observed:

“The commonality of the descriptive word DIGESTO in the two marks is not sufficient for holding the two marks deceptively similar.”

Hahnemann Scientific Laboratory, a manufacturer of homoeopathic medicines, claimed to have adopted the mark HASLAB'S DIGESTO in 1971 and obtained trademark registration in 1986. The registration lapsed in 1993 and was never renewed.

It claimed that it learnt in May 2024 that Hahnemann Memorial Laboratory was using the mark DIGESTO PLUS for a similar product. It subsequently filed a suit before the Commercial Court and initially obtained an ex-parte injunction.

The Trial Court vacated the injunction on 19 January 2026, holding that the appellant had failed to establish misrepresentation or deception.

The appellant challenged the order before the High Court 76 days after the limitation period had expired. It sought condonation of the delay, stating that it had obtained a fresh trademark registration for HASLAB'S DIGESTO on 26 March 2026.

The High Court observed that “the learned Trial Court, after perusing the documents filed on record, returned a finding... that no documentary material has been filed by the Appellant to show continuous commercial use of the mark between 1981 and 2007.”

The Bench also considered the disclaimer accepted by the appellant in 1986 and held:

“The fact that a disclaimer was sought by the Registrar of Trade Marks shows that the said word DIGESTO was considered common to the trade by the Registrar in the year 1986, and in its considered opinion the Registrar did not want the Appellant to claim exclusivity over the said commonly used word.”

It further noted that Hahnemann Memorial Laboratory had "prima facie established use of the impugned mark at least since 1980, whereas the Appellant has been unable to place on record any cogent evidence establishing use of its mark since 1971.”

The judges also rejected the appellant's reliance on the subsequent trademark registration as sufficient cause for condoning the 76-day delay. They held that the grant of a fresh registration after the impugned order could not, by itself, constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay.

They clarified that the effect of the subsequent trademark registration and the appellant's plea based on the registration in its amended plaint would be considered by the Trial Court during the trial.

Finding no reason to interfere with the Trial Court's findings on goodwill, misrepresentation and balance of convenience, and holding that the appeal was independently barred by limitation, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal along with all pending applications.

Accordingly, the High Court directed the Trial Court to proceed with the trial in a time-bound manner.