120-Day Written Statement Period Must Be Computed Under General Clauses Act: Bombay High Court

The Bombay High Court on 7 September held that whether the 120-day period for filing a written statement in a commercial suit has expired must be determined by correctly computing the period under Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and not by applying a strict or liberal construction of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Justice N. J. Jamadar allowed Jyoti Structures Ltd.'s writ petition against Africa Power Company CC and set aside the Commercial Court's 18 June 2026 order rejecting its application to condone the alleged one-day delay in filing the written statement. The Bench observed:

“However, the question as to whether the period of 120 days has expired or not, is not a matter of strict or liberal construction of the provisions of the Act, 2015. It is simply a matter of computation of the period, applying the well established principle incorporated in Section 9 of the Act, 1897, in the matter of computation of time. The strict construction of the provisions contained in the Act, 2015, does not imply that, the provisions of the Act, 2015, shall not be correctly construed. In other words, the strict construction cannot be equated with an erroneous interpretation of the provisions.”

Africa Power Company had filed a commercial suit seeking recovery of amounts allegedly due under agreements. The summons was served on Jyoti Structures on 22 May 2025. Jyoti Structures filed its written statement along with a Notice of Motion on 19 September 2025, contending that the date of service had to be excluded while computing the 120-day period and that the filing was therefore on the 120th day.

The Commercial Court rejected the contention, relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in Ashish Pradyuman Bhankaria & Ors. v. Amit Pradyuman Bhankaria & Ors., which held that the date of service of the writ of summons was not required to be excluded while computing the prescribed period.

The High Court rejected Africa Power Company's argument that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act was inconsistent with Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act. It held that Section 9 only provides a rule for computing time and does not extend the statutory 120-day period.

It held that the date of service had to be excluded since Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure uses the expression “from”, thereby attracting Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. It further observed:

“The submission on behalf of the Respondent that, having regard to the object of the Act, 2015 and the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act, 2015, the provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act, 1897, have no application, does not carry much substance. By virtue of the non obstante clause contained in Section 21 of the Act, 2015, the provisions contained therein, will prevail over anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force.”

The Bench also held that reliance on Ashish Bhankaria was misplaced as that case concerned computation of a period fixed by the Supreme Court during the COVID-19 pandemic.

After excluding the date of service, it found that Jyoti Structures had filed its written statement on the 120th day. It also noted that Africa Power Company had fairly stated that delays by other defendants in the same suit had been condoned for identical reasons.

Accordingly, the High Court held that the alleged one-day delay arose only due to incorrect computation of the 120-day period and allowed Jyoti Structures' writ petition. It condoned the delay and directed that its written statement be taken on record.

For Petitioner: Senior Advocate Ashish Kamat, Advocates Ashwin Bhadang, Abhilash Chaudhary, Amandeep Saini, i/b Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co

For Respondent: Advocates Megha Chandra, a/w Vijay Purohit, Nikita Bangera, Mr. Abhilash Gaur, i/b P & A Law Offices